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 ABSTRACT 
The bulk of quantitative research on hometown associations (HTAs) focuses on cross 
country comparisons.  However, research has not sufficiently addressed the context of 
exit and variation across sending states in Mexico.  Using the Latino National Survey 
(LNS), logistic regression, and multi-level modeling of Mexican census and survey 
data, this paper proceeds to fill this gap in the literature.  Particularly, this thesis 
considers the influence of civic and political participation after migration, cross border 
activity, social, and household resources in the United States.  Additionally, the 
uniqueness of the LNS will allow for testing political participation in Mexico, prior to 
migration, and perceptions of government on HTA participation.  My initial findings 
confirm prior research that past experiences in Mexico matter.  Additionally, they 
illuminate some important reasons that lead to variation of Mexican civic participation 
in the United States.  
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PREFACE 
In 2006 less than one in five Mexican migrants was a naturalized U.S. citizen.  
As a consequence, political participation in United States electoral politics remains out 
of reach for many Mexican migrants.  However, this should not lead us to believe that 
Mexican migrants are not politically active, but rather that we broaden our 
understanding of political participation to include political practices such as 
participation in Mexican hometown associations (HTAs). 
Social capital and immigration scholars have perceived HTAs with great 
skepticism because of their insular networks, cooptation by  Mexican political 
institutions, and a singular orientation to towns of origin (Gonzalez 1999; Fitzgerald 
2003).   However, there is growing evidence that HTA orientations and interests are 
becoming much more amplified; moreover, what remains understated is their unique 
capacity to foster political capital amongst non-citizens (Voss and Bloemraad 2011).  I 
argue that the widening of politics by HTAs raises important prospects for greater 
inclusion of Latino immigrants into U.S. politics.   
Conversely, some social capital scholars posit that a negative relationship 
exists between ethnically diversified communities and social capital.  In a 2006 
lecture, Robert D. Putnam outlined a gloomy prospect for social capital in the U.S. due 
in part to a greater diversified populace in the United States (Putnam 2007).  In 
summary, individuals who live in ethnically diverse communities will continue to 
“hunker down”, or exhibit lower in-group and out-group trust and we can expect to see 
reduced participation in affairs.  In the medium to long run Putnam’s prognosis leaves 
room for small gains.  For example, Putnam acknowledges the contributions made by 
  xi 
immigrants to culture, economy, and demographics.  He posits that immigrant 
communities will offset social capital decline by novel and more encompassing 
identities. 
What Putnam’s analysis misses is that many forms of social capital migrate 
simultaneously with immigrants themselves. In a recent finding that looks at the 
relationship between population transference and social capital across MSA counties, 
the authors conclude that “social capital consists of facets that are not place based, so 
that migrants can be viewed as “taking their bowling balls with them” when they 
move (Lesage & Ha 2012:24) .  Additionally, cross country analysis demonstrates that 
institutions and policy in receiving countries strongly mitigate the strength and 
direction of the relationship (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010).   
Political capital is only one of various manifestations of social capital.  A 
cursory exploration of history reminds us of various examples where migration to the 
United States positively influenced the polity, such as the Progressive Era.  
Henceforth, it is of no surprise that in previous waves of immigration the English 
brought with them a rich history of opposition and organizing against the British and 
Germans enriched U.S. civic culture through their associations know as 
“vereine”(Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001).   
Thus, under certain circumstances, we can expect similarities between prior 
migration waves and contemporary migrants.  In response to social capital scholars 
that singularly prioritize place based social capital in the United States, the project at 
hand exploits individual level data to evaluate and argue that immigrant political 
participation in HTAs can be thought of as transference of civic culture from Mexico 
  xii 
to the United States.  However, place based social capital in sending countries needs to 
be included in our understanding of Latino politics.  A relational understanding of 
civic culture across the migration process is necessary.  As elaborated by Moya, “[t]o 
focus only on their experiences in the new land is to miss half the story.  It treats 
immigrants as tabula rasa and can lead to over-environmentalist conclusions that miss 
possible continuities and adaptations”(2005). 
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 Pre-migration socialization and context of exit 
In her earlier work, Peggy Levitt elaborated on how migrants bring ideas, 
behavior, identities, and social capital to receiving countries where they are remolded 
and remitted to countries of origin (1998).   Her analysis complements our 
understanding context of exit and context of reception which posits that migrant’s 
individual characteristics shaped by country of origin context interact with opportunity 
structures in the receiving country (Portes and Rumbaut 1990).  A great deal of 
research looks at receiving countries and political incorporation, but less is known 
about the effects of pre-migration political participation and the effect of sending 
countries on political incorporation; far less is known about its effects on HTA 
membership.  
Logically, the effects of pre-migration political participation should be straight 
forward; politically active individuals in the home country continue to be active in the 
receiving country and possibly in home country politics.  However, in practice several 
counterfactual examples exist primarily due to international relations and sending 
country context1.  For example, amongst HTAs from Columbia, Mexico, and the 
Dominican Republic; Columbian migrants in general were found less likely to 
participate in HTAs because of high levels of insecurity in Columbia and its 
debilitating effects on civic culture (Portes, Escobar et al. 2009).  Early Cuban 
migration presents an extreme example where unfavorable US-Cuban relations, such 
as restricted travel and remittances, discouraged all forms of home country loyalty 
1 For the effects of capacity and desire to remit see Carling, J., M. B. Erdal, et al. (2012). "How does 
Conflict in Migrants’ Country of Origin Affect Remittance-Sending? Financial Priorities and 
Transnational Obligations Among Somalis and Pakistanis in Norway." International Migration Review 
46(2): 283-309. 
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 regardless of pre-migration undertakings.  Eckstein notes the importance that capacity 
and desire exert on home country loyalties, none of which existed among early Cuban 
emigrants resulting in truncated HTAs exclusively focused in the United States 
(2009).   However, her comparison to recent waves of Cuban migration demonstrates 
change in both capacity and desire and underscores their temporal dimension.  A 
second method to evaluate home country loyalties is through a relational 
understanding that incorporates two axis of variation2: migrant characteristics, and 
characteristics of the interstate system (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).  However, 
this view like other cross country comparisons bolsters the political landscape between 
countries at the expense of specific sending country considerations3. 
When we incorporate home country context in our analysis of cross-border ties 
we introduce the ability of studying place based effects in Mexico on cross border ties.  
In this thesis, I argue that understanding HTA membership and Mexican ecological 
considerations requires the incorporation of subnational states.  Inclusion of 
subnational provinces in our analysis is needed to account for the diverse migrant 
population in the United States driven by regionalized and changing migration 
patterns, as well as decentralization in Mexico.  It is true that other units of analysis 
are better to able to measure the contextual contours of civic life before migration, 
such as municipalities or neighborhoods.   Thus, sub-national states are not taken for 
granted as the most appropriate unit of analysis, but are used due to data limitations.  
2 Both methods to evaluate home country loyalties acknowledge the importance of temporality; 
unfortunately, it is not included in this analysis due to methodological constraints.   
3 Some exceptions include Portes and collaborators who recently analyzed data from the Comparative 
Immigrant Organization Project (CIOP).  Still the variety of independent variables and country selection 
used to analyze CIOP data suggest that different types of expatriate engagement vary by country and 
independent variables. 
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 Some important criticisms for using states in our analysis include findings that suggest 
that 3x1 remittances are clustered around the central areas of municipalities and the 
understudied political mobilization taking place in sub-municipalities (Fox 2007).  
Secondly, we can not take “cross-border activities” or “engagement in home-country 
politics” at face value without differentiation between the various types of cross-
border activities and their internal logic.  Below I will elaborate on these two 
arguments.  
A sizeable population of Mexicans live in the United States, about 11 million 
according to 2010 American Community Survey,  or roughly 10 percent of Mexico’s 
total population.  Hence, we should expect to see remarkable Mexican region of origin 
diversity in the United States.  The regionalization of Mexican emigration is 
historically influenced by network-driven migration; leading to over-representation of 
certain states and regions in Mexico.  Table 1 illustrates the regional origins of 
Mexican migrants in the United States according to two survey data sources and total 
regional population according to the Mexican Census.  The table is included for two 
reasons.  First, it allows us to compare region of origin by survey respondents to the 
population distribution in Mexico.  Table 1 clearly shows over-representation of 
Mexican migrants from traditional states and under-representation of southeastern 
states4.  Secondly, if we compare survey data sources to each other we find that some 
convergence in the regional origin of respondents.  One exception is the lower 
percentage of migrants from the border region reported by the Matricula Consular 
Program (see footnote on page 23 for an explanation of matriculas consulares).  
4 For a list of states by sending regions see table 3 on page 41. 
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 However, because matriculas are processed in greater numbers in Mexican border 
states, it is possible that this might explain the low percentage of migrants who 
participated in the Matricula Consular Program.  Thus, the convergence of the two 
survey data sources suggests the LNS is a reliable source of data.  
Table 1. Regional Origins of Mexican Migrants: LNS, Matricula Consular Program, 
Mexican Census 
 
Sending Region INEGI-2005 LNS-2006 SRE-2006 
Traditional 23% 45.3% 45.2% 
Border 21% 21.9% 10.7% 
Central 40% 27.8% 37.4% 
Southeast 17% 05.0% 06.4% 
TOTAL 101% 100% 99.7% 
 
Source: INEGI Conteo de Pobalcion Hombres-Mujeres por Entidad Federativa Segun Sexo. Latino 
National Survey (LNS), Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Mexico (SRE). 
 
Until recently, traditional sending states have comprised the majority of 
migration flows from Mexico to the United States accounting for almost 70 percent of 
all US bound Mexican migration in the 1970s (Massey, Rugh et al. 2010).  By the 
1990s migration increased from both central and southeast regions.  According to 
Figure 1, in 2006 gains as a percentage of total annual migration into the United States 
were made by non-traditional sending regions.  Meanwhile overall declines were 
recorded by traditional and northern regions.  Similarly, figure 2 demonstrates a 
notable peak in percentage change in 2002 and 2005 in the southeastern region. 
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 Figure 1. Annual Migrations to United States by Mexican Region of Origin as 
Percentage of Total Migration 
 
Source: Estimations by CONAPO based on CONAPO, STPS, INM, SRE y EL COLEF, Encuesta sobre 
Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF NORTE), 1995, 1999-2010. 
 
Figure 2. Mexican Annual Migration to United States by Regional Percentage Change 
 
Source: Estimations by CONAPO based on CONAPO, STPS, INM, SRE y EL COLEF, Encuesta sobre 
Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF NORTE), 1995, 1999-2010. 
 
Little research accounts for regional and ecological considerations in cross-
border activities.  For example, Mexican HTA membership is most prevalent in rural 
communities with dense migration networks (Guarnizo, Sanchez et al. 1999).  
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 Similarly, Salvadorian migrants from small towns and rural areas with low levels of 
personal and political insecurity are more likely to engage in cross-border activities 
(Portes 2003).  However, less data and research has considered the role of 
decentralization in the co-production5 of HTAs at the subnational level.   
Since the 1990s, Mexico has been moving from a highly centralized and 
authoritarian state towards greater decentralization and democratization.  Literature on 
the role of decentralization on democratization has proven inconclusive.  However, 
experts on Mexican politics assert that decentralization benefits the ability of the state 
to respond more effectively through localized policy, decision making, and 
responsiveness to citizens6 (Selee 2011).  Decentralization and democratization unfold 
unevenly across Mexico resulting in different levels of institutionalization at the 
subnational level.  For example, in 1993 Mexican state governments began to take 
charge of various emigrant affairs typically addressed by the Consular system through 
the newly created Offices of Emigrant Affairs (Oficinas de Atencion Migrantes-
OFAM) at the state level.  Various authors have studied the uneven co-production of 
sub-national state engagement with emigrants (Smith 2003; Vila Freyer 2007; 
Iskander 2010).  The richness of these studies rest on comparative case studies 
between a few states.  Incorporating quantitatively driven analysis in this area of 
5 This term denotes symmetrical and unsymmetrical participation of migrants and Mexican state—via 
bureaucrats—in the making of civic activity and HTAs.  Iskander elaborates the complexity of this 
process through the term interpretative engagement. This term denotes the discourse of policy 
created and re-created in a changing context be it contentious or collaborative leading to continual 
creative process of interpretation and creation (2010). 
6 Selee’s understanding of decentralization is far more nuanced than elaborated above and 
incorporates greater agency and a relational understanding of informal power in the process of 
decentralization to include, but not limited to, political leaders, institutions, businesses, and civil 
society (2011).   
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 inquiry can increase our understanding of HTA activity across many more states and 
regions and increase the ability to explore multiple dimensions of the co-production 
process7.  
Secondly, researchers have taken “cross-border activities” and “engagement in 
home-country politics” at face value without differentiation; only recently have 
researchers begun to differentiate between the two (Waldinger 2009; Waldinger, Soehl 
et al. 2012).  These authors demonstrate the primacy effect that pre-migration political 
participation in home countries have on the political interest and opinions of Mexican 
migrants in the United States.  According to the authors pre-migration voting and 
organizational membership weigh more heavily than various measurements of cross 
border ties.  These findings illustrate that cross border activities are not everything 
under the sun. 
The project at hand partially fills the lacuna noted above in two important 
ways.  First, I control for context of exit by incorporating within country variation 
between Mexican subnational states into my analysis.  Secondly, in order to build on 
the existing literature of transnationalism and to provide greater specificity to the 
various types of cross border activities I limit my outcome variable to HTA 
membership for two important reasons.   
To begin with, HTA membership denotes action and investment on the part of 
individuals—civic action—in contrast to thinner versions of politics such as political 
7 Lanly and Valenzuela note that individual OFAM offices have had a variety of success in engagement 
with HTAs (2004).  For example, pioneer states like Zacatecas have been the most successful while 
Oaxaca and Michoacán have been slow to engage emigrants.  For a analysis on how state offices have 
various histories, budgets, and levels of organization leading to divergent forms of institutionalization 
see: Barbosa, G. Y. and R. Alarcon (2010). "Politica de emigracion y gobiernos estatales en Mexico." 
Migraciones Int. Migraciones Internacionales 5(4): 165-198. (2010). 
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 belief, opinions, or interest in the sending country.  Secondly, qualitative research on 
HTAs samples on the dependent variable to singularly include HTA members in their 
analysis8.  Using HTA membership as an outcome variable in logistic regression 
analysis allows us to include both members and non-members alike.  Below I cover 
some of the reasons that migrants join HTAs as well as elaborate why cross-border 
activities are different and as evidence for my choice of outcome variable. 
Conditions Influential to Migrant Civic Participation 
Various estimates put Mexican HTA participation somewhere between 4 to 14 
percent9.  However, this measurement begs the question of an adequate reference 
category to compare civic participation. Fox and Bada recommend that civic 
participation rates could be compared between individuals from Mexico of similar 
backgrounds to HTA participants in the United States (2011).  Authors like Putnam 
might question what a 4 to 14 percent HTA participation rate means particularly when 
US civic participation was recently measured to be 36 percent10 and arguably in 
decline.  To complicate our comparison, Mexico consistently ranks lower than the 
United States in civic participation according to the Freedom House, World Values, 
and Polity IV survey (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010).  In fact, Mexican HTA 
participation in itself is a remarkable endeavor given the odds that Mexican migrants 
8 For a recent exception see Santana, R. (2012). The life and death of hometown associations. The 
University of Chicago). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 249. 
9 In our sample the rate of civic participation amongst Mexican immigrants was 4 percent in 
comparison to 6 percent of Mexicans in the 2006 National Survey of Latinos.  For Latinos in general it 
was 14 percent according to Suro (2005) and 10 percent according to a Hispanic Pew survey (Suro and 
Escobar: 2006).  Interestingly, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los 
Angeles survey found that less than 8 percent of the second generation was involved in civic groups 
from their parents hometown (Fox and Bada: 2008).  
10 See the internet and Civic Engagement by the Pew Internet, 2009. 
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 face when it comes to political incorporation in the United States.  However, we 
should also be reminded that HTA participation is the exception, rather than the rule 
amongst Mexican migrants and is rare.  
Because HTA participation is exceptional, it would behoove us to understand 
the impetus by migrants towards collection action.  Below I will outline some 
important works on civic participation broadly speaking to contextualize this thesis 
and elaborate how prior research has theorized and examined HTAs.  Although, 
Segura et al.  find that citizenship status, English ability, and socioeconomic status are 
negatively related to social capital and civic participation amongst Latinos, I argue that 
HTA membership follows a different logic (2001).  For example, Ramakrishnan and 
Viramontes (2010)  found that HTAs foster participation11 amongst limited English 
and undocumented immigrants.  In a survey of Mexican migrants, Suro and Escobar 
also found that 45 percent of HTA participants had a Matricula Consular12 (2006).  In 
terms of political ideology, Mexican political party affiliation amongst HTA members 
was measured to be about the same as the larger Mexican immigrant population (Suro 
and Escobar 2006).  With regard to gender dynamics in HTAs, leadership in HTAs is 
limited to male participants and to a lesser degree membership in general is male 
dominated (Goldring: 2001).   I argue that English proficiency and undocumented 
status, found elsewhere to be detrimental to wider forms of civic engagement for 
11 Other forms of discrimination exit besides those put forward by Ramakrishnan (2008) that could 
plausibly lead to HTA activity.  For example, employment based discrimination, reported by  17 
percent of all interviewees in the LNS survey (Fraga et al: 2010) 
12A Matriula Consular is a Mexican issued national identification card provided to Mexican nationals 
who may lack a form of identification in the United States.  Because undocumented migrants are 
unable to obtain US issued identification cards, with the few exceptions of U.S. state-based drivers 
license, ownership of Matriculas is a close approximation for undocumented status.  
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 Latinos, encourage membership in Mexican HTAs.  Regrettably, aside from typical 
socio-economic status (SES) variables, the relationship between individual 
characteristics and HTA membership has escaped the purview of regression analysis 
for variety of reasons, chiefly due to the absence of survey data.  This thesis extends 
this area of inquiry to provide greater understanding of individual participation in 
HTAs. 
In a limited fashion, quantitative research has relegated HTA participation to a 
singular role as an independent variable of interest (DeSipio, Pachon et al. 2003).  
Earlier research was primarily interested in testing whether transnational ties were 
detrimental or complimentary to US political participation.  HTA participation, along 
with other types of cross-border activities such as visits home, remittances, etc. were 
employed to test their effects on US political participation.  Much ink has been spilled 
on this topic but the growing consensus is that participation in country of origin 
mutually reinforces participation in the receiving country, rather than a zero-sum 
relationship (DeSipio, Pachon et al. 2003; Pantoja 2005; Escobar 2006; Smith 2006; 
Portes, Escobar et al. 2009; Escobar 2010)13.  
The decline of a zero-sum paradigm—the proposition that political and civic 
participation can only be directed to either country of destination or origin at the 
detriment of the other—has paved the way for a wave of authors to expand our 
understanding of the various causes of transnationalism and the interrogation of 
transnationalism itself.  Three authors are noteworthy: Waldinger (2008), Soehl and 
13 However, Tsuda points out some exceptions to the growing number of positive reinforcing cases, 
such as home country long-distance nationalism, to illustrate the importance that simultaneity must 
play in a transnational research agenda (2012).   
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 Waldinger (2010); Waldinger, Soehl et al. (2012), and Felix (2010).  Waldinger, a 
prominent critic of transnationalism, scrutinizes the usage and determinants of an all-
encompassing definition of transnationalism to improve its conceptual clarity.  He 
regresses on three major groupings of dependent variables: cross-border exchange and 
activities, home country attachment and loyalties, and participation in U.S. politics 
(2008).  His findings suggest that transnational ties are uncommon, and differ across 
groups and forms of transnationalism.  For example, recent migrants are more likely to 
remit; meanwhile, more established migrants are better able and likely to travel.  Soehl 
and Waldinger (2010), build on prior findings, with data from the 2006 National 
Survey of Latinos, to formalize the types of ongoing cross-border activities, the length 
of time they are sustained, and the types of migrants that sustain them.  The authors 
use various variables to regress on  a three-prong classification of migrants 
(transmigrants, bordered, and connected) as well as travel to home country, 
remittances, and telephone communication.  Their results support Waldinger’s earlier 
findings but with a greater diversity of dependent variables. In the authors’ own words 
“we find a bundle of discrete activities, each following its own logic, associated with 
specific migrant characteristics” (1509: 2010).  In contrast to Waldinger’s more 
expansive investigation of various forms of transnationalism, this thesis only considers 
HTA membership as a specific form of transnationalim, as an outcome variable, to 
elaborate on the effects of individual and group characteristics and their particular 
logic leading to HTA participation. 
As noted above, there is little research on the effects of sub-national variation 
on HTA participation, however, there is a growing body of literature that focuses on 
11 
 
 intra-group variation of Mexican migrants in the United States (Zuniga and 
Hernandez-Leon 2005; Waldinger, Lim et al. 2007; Vallejo 2009; Felix 2010; Jiménez 
2010; Telles 2010).  Of these authors only Felix analyzes Mexican HTAs by sub-
national states of origin but uses HTA participation as an independent variable.  
Nonetheless by focusing on Mexican states, Felix is able to control for large intra-
group variation in order to regress various variables on political interest, government 
contact, and US organizational membership (2010).  Thus, following the groundwork 
laid by Waldinger and associates this paper continues to carry the baton to better 
define transnationalism, its practices, and actors as they pertain to Mexican HTAs.  
Lastly, a recent and important contribution to the immigrant civic participation 
literature is the importance of family.  For immigrants, the family is a central resource 
that determines among other things where people migrate, how much is remitted, and 
ultimately how successful individuals will integrate in the United States (Glick 2010).  
Notwithstanding the importance of family in the integration process, little has been 
written regarding the importance of immigrant families in the political socialization 
process.  Some notable exceptions include Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez, who find 
greater politicization by protest marchers from mixed-status families and from youth 
who adhered to a wider and symbolic definition of family (2011).  However, one line 
of research rest on the premise that thick family ties are a source of low social capital 
(Banfield 1958; Verba, Schlozman et al. 2005).  This line of inquiry argues that strong 
family ties or leads to an increase in trust within families at the expense of trust in 
others outside the family, hypothesized to lead to low civic participation (Ljunge 
2012).  
12 
 
 A study by Alesina and Giuliano, used two surveys to test the significance of 
family ties on political trust, political participation, and trust of others outside the 
family within various countries among second generation immigrants (2011).  For 
second generation immigrants, the authors find a converse relationship between family 
ties in parent’s birth country and political interest as well as political activism in 
receiving country.  However, in a separate study, Ljunge finds that stronger family ties 
lead to stronger civic virtues and civic virtues are negatively related to political 
participation (2011).  Ljunge’s findings resolve what might seem as contradictory 
results.  In comparison to Alesina et al., Ljunge argues that family ties are 
complimentary to social capital, by way of civic virtues.  For example, immigrants 
with strong family ties are much more likely to oppose exploiting others for individual 
gains, and believe it is more important that children learn respect for others.  Ljunge 
speculates that those who are political active are likely moved by individual gains, a 
belief that is at odds with respondents with strong civic virtues (2012).  The 
aforementioned studies primarily focus on the transmission of political culture to the 
second generation, however, research on HTAs suggests that membership declines in 
subsequent generations.  Nonetheless, the research highlights the importance of 
families that foster civic virtue and participation, thus, the inclusion of household 
variables is important in evaluating HTA membership. 
Research Questions 
Below I pose five questions to address some gaps in the literature.  Of these questions, 
I pay particular attention to the sending country concerning ecological and regional 
considerations, political and civic participation antecedent to migration.  In addition, I 
13 
 
 include questions common in the transnational literature but particularly attuned to 
HTAs; the influence of cross-border activities and U.S. civic participation that bolsters 
membership in them.  Lastly, demographic characteristics and perceptions towards 
government are specified. 
Q1: Traditional sending regions have a long and robust history of migration to 
the United States due to selectivity and network driven migration.  Do 
traditional sending regions increase the likelihood of HTA membership?  In 
other words, does a high proportion of migrants from specific sending regions 
drive HTA participation? 
H1: I anticipate that migrants from this region will be more likely to participate 
in HTAs.  As stated before, their long migration history, more established 
presence in the United States, and concentration suggest that HTA membership 
is more likely.   
Q2: Does political and civic participation before migration increase the 
likelihood of HTA membership? 
H2: Two prior studies using LNS data, report pre-migration civic and political 
participation are important determinants of thinner forms of cross-border 
activities, like opinion of expatriate voting, attention to Mexican politics, HTA 
membership, naturalization, and skepticism towards government (Jones-Correa 
2008; Waldinger, Soehl et al. 2012).  Thus, a positive relationship is expected 
between pre-migration civic and political participation and HTA membership, 
a thicker form of cross-border activity.  
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 Q3: Which types of cross-border ties increase the chances of HTA 
membership? 
H3: Waldinger argues that a particular set of cross-border activities follow a 
particular logic (2007).  For HTA membership I posit that the following cross-
border ties are conducive to HTA membership: visits to Mexico, remittances, 
and property ownership. 
Q4: Does civic participation after migration increase participation in HTAs? 
H4: Contemporary literature on transnationalism suggests that civic and 
political participation here and in the home-country are mutually reinforcing 
(DeSipio, Pachon et al. 2003; Pantoja 2005; Escobar 2006; Smith 2006; Portes, 
Escobar et al. 2009; Escobar 2010).  Thus, I surmise that migrant’s civic and 
political participation in the United States and towards the home country 
mutually and positively reinforce HTA participation. 
Q5: Does the amount of socio-economic resources affect the likelihood of 
HTA membership?  
H5: Transnational activity in general is most common amongst well-
established migrants who have the economic resources to engage in two 
countries (Soehl and Waldinger 2010).  However, less is known about the 
influence of individual and household level socio-economic resources on HTA 
participation in particular.  Like other forms of transnationalism we expect that 
greater individual resources will increase HTA participation.  Thus, higher 
levels of educational attainment are expected to increase the likelihood of HTA 
participation. 
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 H52:For households, given the importance of family on civic virtues and 
greater resources, noted above, I posit that dense households measured by the 
greater number of people who contribute to household income are more likely 
to hold HTA membership (Ljunge 2012).  Households that receive government 
assistance and those with low household income with are hypothesized to be 
negatively related to HTA membership. 
Q5: Does mistrust of government affect HTA membership? 
H5: HTAs oftentimes replace local governments in the provision of amenities 
in local communities of origin.  The lack of service provisions is a source of 
skepticism in Mexico, which has been found to positively influence democracy 
(Cleary and Stokes 2006).  In contrast to research that suggests a negative 
relationship between trust and civic participation, I posit that skepticism among 
Mexican immigrants and members of HTAs is likely channeled to HTA 
membership (Chávez, Wampler et al. 2006).  Thus, I expect that negative 
perceptions towards government may increase HTA membership. 
Data and Methodology 
Data for this paper derives from pooling the 2006 Latino National Survey and 
the 2007 Latino National Survey-New England.  The former is composed of 8,634 
interviews and is representative of 87.5 percent of the target universe of Latinos in the 
United States.  The latter is comprised of 1,200 interviews that represent the Latino 
population in the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.  State 
samples were stratified and selected based on their total Latino population.  Arkansas, 
Georgia, Iowa, and North Carolina were included in the sample to account for 
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 changing and emerging Latino communities.  Additionally, some states were 
internally sampled proportionally and non-proportionally to increase representation of 
smaller regions and enhance cross region comparisons respectively.  The national 
margin of error was 1.05 percent.   
Respondents were self-identified Latinos/as and interviews were conducted in 
Spanish and/or English.  Interviews were conducted over the phone with the use of 
computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) from November 2005 to August 2006 
by Latin Force Group LLC.  
For my purposes the LNS is an ideal data source.  About 71 percent of all 
foreign-born respondents reported country of birth as Mexico.  It contains 3,879 cases 
of Mexican immigrants by sub-national states of origin.  I conducted mean 
imputations for date of arrival, birthdate, number supported by income, and number 
who contribute to income.  After imputations I used listwise deletion to exclude 
missing data.  I included “missing” and “don’t” know responses for categorical 
dependent variables in the regression equations to increase number of observations in 
all the models; leaving me with 3,726 cases for analysis (see Table 2 below).  To my 
knowledge the National Survey of Latinos (2006), the Intergenerational Mobility in 
Metropolitan Los Angeles survey (2004), and the Survey of Mexican Workers (2005) 
are the only surveys that capture HTA membership, country of origin, and subnational 
states.  Of these surveys, none covers the depth and breadth of political practices that 
the LNS capture.  Most importantly, the LNS is the only survey to capture political 
behavior before and after migration.  For these reasons, the LNS is a unique and ideal 
choice of data for the analysis at hand. 
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 Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Mexican States by HTA Participation 
 
  % Participation in HTAs Total 
  
No Yes   
Aguascalientes 0.01  0.03  0.01  
  (36) (5) (41) 
Baja California Norte 0.01  0.03  0.01  
  (45) (5) (50) 
Baja California Sur 0.00  0.01  0.00  
  (11) (1) (12) 
Campeche 0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (3) (0) (3) 
Coahuila 0.02  0.01  0.02  
  (82) (2) (84) 
Colima 0.01  0.02  0.01  
  (30) (3) 33  
Chiapas 0.01  0.01  0.01  
  (36) (2) (38) 
Chihuahua 0.09  0.06  0.09  
  (337) (9) (346) 
Districto Federal (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
  (228) (4) (232) 
Durango 0.04  0.03  0.04  
  (162) (4) (166) 
Guanajuato 0.08  0.08  0.08  
  (305) (12) (317) 
Guerrero 0.05  0.06  0.05  
  (183) (10) (193) 
Hidalgo 0.02  0.04  0.02  
  (84) (6) (90) 
Jalisco 0.11  0.11  0.11  
  (394) (17) (411) 
Estado de Mexico 0.04  0.04  0.04  
  (148) (6) (154) 
Michoacan 0.11  0.09  0.11  
  (405) (14) (419) 
Morelos 0.02  0.01  0.02  
  (75) (2) (77) 
Nayarit 0.01  0.00  0.01  
  (38) (0) (38) 
Nuevo Leon 0.02  0.01  0.02  
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   (69) (1) (70) 
Oaxaca 0.02  0.06  0.02  
  (87) (9) (96) 
Puebla 0.04  0.06  0.04  
  (141) (10) (151) 
Queretaro 0.01  0.01  0.01  
  (30) (2) (32) 
Quintana Roo 0.00  0.01  0.00  
  (3) (1) (4) 
San Luis Potosi 0.03  0.04  0.03  
  (93) (7) (100) 
Sinaloa 0.02  0.01  0.02  
  (58) (1) (59) 
Sonora 0.03  0.04  0.03  
  (100) (7) (107) 
Tabasco 0.00  0.01  0.00  
  (11) (2) (13) 
Tamaulipas 0.02  0.01  0.02  
  (92) (1) (93) 
Tlaxcala 0.00  0.01  0.00  
  (7) (1) (8) 
Veracruz 0.03  0.02  0.03  
  (117) (3) (120) 
Yucatan 0.00  0.01  0.00  
  (2) (1) (3) 
Zacatecas 0.04  0.03  0.04  
  (162) (4) (166) 
DK/REF 0.03  0.04  0.03  
  (118) (7) (125) 
Total  1.00  1.00  1.00  
N (3692) (159) (3851) 
Source: Latino National Survey 2006 
However, some reservations of the data warrant closer attention.  For example, 
consider the wording of the question utilized to measure pre-migration civic 
participation in the analysis: 
M.17 Before you came to the United States, how active were you in a political party, a political 
organization, or in any type of organizations such as labor unions, student organizations or 
paramilitary organizations?  
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   The question above aggregates five different types of civic and political 
participation into a single response.  Moreover, the inclusion of membership in 
paramilitary organizations raises some doubts regarding response bias.  For example 
the questions may lead to respondent satisficing, biased or incomplete reporting by 
survey subjects to provide a socially desirable response (Krosnick 1991).  Similarly, 
questions dealing with sensitive information, such as admittance of membership in 
paramilitary organizations, can bias response out of concern of possible repercussions 
of divulging sensitive information (Tourangeau and Yan 2007).  However, the 
accuracy of the question was tested by triangulating the rate of participation, elicited 
by the question above, with other civic participation measurements in Mexico.  For 
instance, the 2005 World Survey found that 9.7 percent and 7.6 percent of all 
respondents were active participants in a political party and/or union respectively.  
Similarly, 9.1 percent of all LNS respondents reported active membership to the 
survey question under discussion.  The percent of participants in the LNS aggregated 
variable falls between the two forms of participation measured in the World Survey, 
indicating some convergence and confidence that the LNS accurately represents pre-
migration civic participation.  Relatedly, it also raises concern that civic participation 
might not be selective on the migration process.  That is, that migrants are no more 
likely to be civically active than non-migrants14.   
A more general concern with pre-migration variables is recall bias.  Described 
by Turangeau et al. as the second of four steps in the cognitive process when 
14 A more adequate research design for exploring selectivity of migration on civic participation would 
require a comparison between regions with high and low migration and between migrant and non-
migrants from these regions. 
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 answering survey questions (Tourangeau, Rips et al. 2000).  Particularly, the second 
step pertains to the process in which respondents recall pertinent information from 
long-term memory to formulate a response.  The length of time since occurrence of 
event is important given that the greater the time between interview and event can 
increase error.  Error in general is expected, but the accuracy of responses from 
individuals who have spent a considerable amount of time in the United States since 
first migration is of most concern.  For example, if we look at the 1,324 respondents 
who reported voting in Mexico before migration we find that 3 percent, 40 
respondents, self-reported voting at age seventeen or younger15.  It is entirely possible 
that the majority of error is due to misreporting of first date of migration.  However, 
there is no way to distinguishing between those who misreported voting before 
migration and misreporting of first date of migration.  In either case, the error is small 
enough to be negligible. 
Preliminary logistic regressions show that various individual-level variables 
are important for explaining HTA membership.  In order to account for regional 
variation and clustering, common in migrant populations, regional variables were 
tested in the logit model.  The two regional variables were migration and 
marginalization zones and migration sending regions.  However, this technique 
potentially ignores state level variance not accounted for by the aforementioned 
variables and poses logical and statistical problems (Gelman and Hill 2007).   
15 In the preferred regression model this group of respondents was significant.  
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 In the absence of a more complex model, logically, we may commit ecological 
fallacy16  that is we incorrectly infer something about individuals from the groupings 
to which they belong.  From a technical standpoint, when we take higher order 
variables and assign them to individual level variables for analysis, we violate the 
assumption of independence of observations (Raudenbush and Bryk: 2002:xx).  In 
other words, because we have foreknowledge of where individual respondents come 
from, provincial states in Mexico, our individual observations may present clustering 
and not be independent of each other. 
Alternatively, if we aggregate individual variables into second order variables 
and conduct analysis in the higher order we commit atomic fallacy, or the inference 
about groupings that is incorrectly obtained from individual-level observations.  
Statistically, this error can lead to aggregated variables that eliminate within group 
variation and stronger than usual relationships between the higher order variables and 
non-aggregated variables (Raudenbush and Bryk: 2002:xx). 
To address some of these problems noted I use a hierarchical linear model 
(HLM) to test for state-level effects.  All methodological reasons aside, HLMs are a 
powerful sociological tool to consider the influence of ecology on various forms of 
civic participation like HTA participation.  The conceptual assumptions underlying the 
use of HLM are reminiscent of classical sociological theory and concepts like C. 
Wright Mill’s sociological imagination.  In Mill’s seminal book, by the same title, he 
relates the importance of studying the various components of society.  In his own 
words “[w]hat is specifically ‘sociological’ in the study or any particular feature of a 
For an elaborated evaluation of the term see Openshaw, S. (1984). "Ecological fallacies and the 
analysis of areal census data." Environment and Planning A 16(1): 17-31.  
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 total society is the continual effort to relate that feature to others, in order to gain a 
conception of the whole” (Mills 1959).  Similarly, Mills criticized a sociology that 
espoused “abstracted empiricism”, or the limited theorization of individuals abstracted 
from their surroundings.  In a limited fashion HLM allows for a fuller 
conceptualization of HTA participation.  
Taking into account data availability some ecological considerations include 
analyzing states with greater NGO density to determine if it raises the effect of pre-
migration civic participation and increases the likelihood of HTA participation17.  
Similarly, I may test if states with greater levels of internet access will increase the 
effect of attention paid to home-country politics and increase the likelihood of HTA 
participation.  Or I can use comparable measurements to see if HTA membership in 
primarily driven by individual characteristics or state factors.  For example, I can test 
if states with higher educational averages will increase the effect of individual-level 
education and increase the likelihood of HTA participation. 
Methodologically speaking a HLM is appropriate for this project because it 
allows us to test the effects of higher order variables on lower order variables and 
partially address omitted variable bias (Luke 2004).  Additionally, estimations of 
individual effects can be improved for data with few key observations of interest, such 
as HTA membership, by pooling data and weighting it (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  
Observations that are comparatively low in numbers with poor estimation can borrow 
strength from pooled units. Another advantage of HLM is to address possible omitted 
variable bias like unit heterogeneity.  Unit heterogeneity can lead to different y-
17 See appendix for state-level regression tables  
23 
 
                                                 
 intercepts and different means.  For example, a fixed effects HLM can address 
problems that arise by units with same slopes but varying intercepts (Snijders 1999). 
The first step of HLM is to test if HLM is necessary in the first place.  I began 
my analysis by testing for between-state and within-state variation.  This required a 
null model and reduced model.  The constrained, or null model, consisted of two 
variables, the Mexican state variable comprised of the thirty-one state provinces and 
Mexico City and the HTA participation variable.  The former variable was designated 
as independent and the latter as dependent.  To test for between-state variation the 
Mexican state variable was designated random effects.  The interclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) was obtained for this model from the output.  Within state variance 
was 0.04 and between-state variation was 0.0002.  In other words, only 0.0002 percent 
of HTA participation can be explained by variation between states.   
Next, in order to verify the significance of between-states variation, I 
conducted a likelihood ratio test to compare the null model and a reduced model.  The 
formula for the likelihood ratio (LR) test is: 𝐿𝑅 = −2(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙).  
As can be expected a substantially smaller statistic for the reduced model is expected 
because of fewer parameters and less accuracy in fit of model.  The null hypothesis 
states that the models are no different and the alternative hypothesis states that a 
significant difference exists and exceeds random chance.  The test resembles a chi-
square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of 
estimated parameters between the two models (Enders 2010).  The null model statistic 
was 1500.854 and the reduced model was not much different (1497.909).  The LR 
score was 2.945, well below the chi-square threshold of 3.841 with a probability of 
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 0.05 with one degree of freedom.  The results indicate that between-state variation is 
not significant and the introduction of random effects does not improve the model.  
Based on this finding, I limit my analysis to individual data from the LNS noted 
above18. 
Independent Variables 
Pre and Post Political Membership and Action 
As previously stated, the effect of pre-migration civic and political capital on 
civic participation in the United States is understudied. The groupings of variables in 
this section serve to test if pre-migration political and civic participation necessarily 
translates to participation in HTAs in the United States post-migration.  The LNS is 
unusually unique in that it captures pre-migration political and civic participation 
through two questions.  The first question asks the following, “Before you came to the 
United States, how active were you in a political party, a political organization, or in 
any other type of organization such as labor unions, student organizations or 
paramilitary organizations?”  This question is coded in a likert scale, ranging from 
never joined to very active, where never joined is the reference category.  Similarly, 
voted in Mexico before migration captures electoral participation before migration, 
this variable is coded into “yes” “no” “DK” (don’t know) and “NA” (not applicable).  
Because HTAs may or may not be explicitly political organizations, including pre-
migration civic and political participation variables is both possible and necessary.   
18 In order to address to address within state correlation, for reasons outlined above, generalized 
estimation equations can be introduced in the model.  This process is preferred because it is best 
suited for non-normal outcome variables, or logistic regression, and coefficients remain unchanged 
while improving standard error.   
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 Post-migration political membership and actions in Mexico are included in the 
model to gauge continued interest and commitment to politics across the migration 
process.  This grouping of variables is also important for determining whether pre-
migration participation necessarily leads to post-migration participation.  The four 
variables are coded into tripartite categories: “yes” “no”  “DK” (don’t know) and 
“NA” (not applicable).   The first variable measures social, cultural, and civic 
participation in the United States after migration labeled membership in organization 
before arrival.  The remaining three variables measure continued interest in home 
politics by the following variables voted in Mexico, contributed money to 
party/candidate in Mexico, and general attention to politics in Mexico.  
Cross-border Activity 
This grouping of variables is meant to test if cross border activities influence 
participation in HTAs? Mexican migrants are part and parcel of a wider network of 
cross-border activity, thus, we hould expect that these connections reinforce HTA 
membership.  The literature on transnationalism, outlined elsewhere in this paper, 
stipulates a deterritorialization of the nation, where fields like commodities, culture, 
affect, etc. supersede national borders and migrants create fields where they may live 
simultaneously in sending and receiving countries.  Scholars of transnationalism posit 
that transnationalism grows through the strengthening of cross border fields and ties.  
The model measures these activities by including visits, remittances19, and property 
19Remittances in emigrant households in Mexico are predominantly used to offset everyday house 
hold expenditures, a smaller percent of migrants use remittances to build homes and home 
renovations, and fewer amounts are used for micro enterprises. The LNS does not disaggregate by 
types of remittances. Rather than assuming a specific functionality, a more generalized hypothesis is 
that greater amounts of remittances reflect a greater connection to Mexico. 
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 ownership in Mexico to test if these variables have a positive relationship with the 
outcome variable.   
Regional Variation 
Research on HTAs suggests that participation is driven primarily by numbers. 
This line of thinking suggests that sending states with a high proportion of migrants 
are most likely to have HTAs.  For example, states like Zacatecas, Guanajuato, San 
Luis Potosi, Durango, Nayarit, and Michoacán have a greater proportion of established 
migrants in the United States, in comparison to states with a much younger history of 
migration that tend to be circular migrants and less established (Lanly and Valenzuela 
Varela 2004).   
Using Durand and Massey’s (2003) typology of sending regions I test the 
influence of regional variation on HTA participation.  Massey’s typology includes the 
following four distinct regions:  traditional20, central, southeastern, and border 
region.  Below, Table 3 list states by regions in Mexico.  To test if HTA participation 
is primarily driven by sheer numbers, the reference category is the southeast region 
because this region is the least represented in LNS data (0.05 percent) and presumably 
the least likely to show HTA participation.  I expect that more established regions--
with large flows of migration--will have a greater likelihood of HTA participation.  
Thus, a positive relationship is expected between regions that have traditionally sent a 
large number of migrants and HTAs participation. 
Table 3. Mexican Sending Regions 
 
 
20 The term “historical region” proposed by Jorge Durand is synonymous to “traditional” sending 
region.  The identification of this region dates back to work by Mexican Anthropologist Manuel Gamio. 
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 Traditional Border Central Southeast 
Aguascalientes 
Colima 
Durango 
Guanajuato 
Jalisco 
Michoacan 
Nayarit 
San Luis Potosi 
Zacatecas 
Baja California 
Chihuahua 
Coahuila 
Nuevo Leon 
Sinaloa 
Sonora 
Tamaulipas 
 
Distrito Federal 
Guerrero 
Hidalgo 
Mexico 
Morelos 
Oaxaca 
Puebla 
Queretaro 
Tlaxcala 
Campeche 
Chiapas 
Quintana Roo 
Tabasco 
Veracruz 
Yucatan 
 
Source: Massey, D. S., J. S. Rugh, et al. (2010). "The Geography of Undocumented Mexican 
Migration." Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 26(1): 129-152. 
 
A second variable is used in the model to account for regional variation based 
on the intensity of migration and marginalization.  The migration and marginalization 
indices are individually created and made available by the Mexican National 
Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion-CONAPO).  The marginalization 
index is comprised of four structural measurements and nine indicators of exclusion at 
the municipal level from two data sources.  Similarly, the migration intensity index is 
comprised of four measurements based on household level data from the bi-centennial 
census long form21.  Replicating the typology used by  Ruiz-Ochoa (2009), I  merge 
the migration and marginalization index into one measurement comprised of four 
categories22 to capture the variation of these two measurements for all Mexican states 
(see Table 4 below) . 
Table 4. Migration and Marginalization Typologies 
21 The census asks whether respondents or any household member, friend, or someone they know has 
lived abroad.  The four measurements of international migration include: 1) percent of households 
that receive remittances, 2) percent of one or more household members abroad, 3) percent who 
returned from abroad in the last five years and who originally left no more than five years ago, 4) and 
percent who have returned in the last five years and who originally left more than five years ago.   
22 A migration and marginalization index score is not available for Mexico City.  Mexico City was 
entered as a fifth category in the migration and marginalization variable to test for influence and to 
maintain as many cases across model.  
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 1. Low Migration and Low Marginalization  
2. High Migration and Low Marginalization 
3. Low Migration and High Marginalization 
4. High Migration and High Marginalization 
Source Ruiz-Ochoa, W. (2009). "Valoracion de la Estrategia de Remeas Colectivas para Combatir la 
Marginacion en Mexico." 
 
The migration index is an important measurement of US-Mexico migration 
and is included in the model to capture the relationship between migration flows and 
HTA membership.  The index is ideal for measuring strength of networks since it 
incorporates both emigration, return migration, and circular migration (Pérez-
Armendáriz and Crow 2010).   Additionally, participation by HTAs in Mexico’s 3x1 
development program23 is skewed towards regions with high migration and middle 
marginalization, as well as states with PAN governorship (Aparicio and Meseguer 
2012).    
The findings noted by the authors above provide us with two important reasons 
for utilizing the indices.  First, they allow us to incorporate an ecological estimation of 
sending regions by simultaneously evaluating migration and marginalization.  By 
including these indices we are provided the opportunity to triangulate and compare our 
results with Aparicio and Meseguer (2012).  For instance, the aforementioned authors 
used a sample singularly restricted to HTAs enrolled in the 3x1 program.  The LNS 
includes a wider type of HTA membership that theoretically includes those in the 3x1 
as well as other types of HTAs.  Findings from my analysis will illustrate some 
23 The 3x1 program is a development scheme where Mexican emigrants pool remittances for 
development projects in their town of origin.  The initial remittance is matched by state and federal 
governments to increase the amount available for development projects.  
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 interesting differences and similarities between findings that only incorporate 3x1 
HTAs and my own.  
To asses the positive relationship between migration intensity and HTA 
participation the preferred reference category is low migration and low 
marginalization24. 
Household Resources 
The literature on migrant civic participation illustrates that individual resources 
such as education and income reinforce civic membership.  However, less is know 
about the effects of household resources on HTA participation. The regression enters 
total household income indexed in increments of 9,999 dollars starting at less than 
$15,000 and ending at $65,000 and above.  Received government assistance and 
number supported by income captures households that could be resource constrained. 
Number contributed to income captures the number of individuals who contribute to 
household income and could be resource endowed households.  For received 
government assistance, I use “never” as the omitted category to capture the positive 
relationship between household resource endowment and HTA participation.   In 
accordance with the literature we expect a positive relationship between household 
resources and HTA participation.  Total household income is an ordinal variable; the 
reference category is below $15,000.  The LNS does not measure family ties or civic 
virtues, however, I can test the relationship between family composition, Number 
supported by income and number contributed to income, and HTA membership; the 
two variables are continuous.   
24 For a discussing regarding the nexus between poverty and migration see Aparicio (2012) and Fox & 
Bada (2008). 
30 
 
                                                 
 Perception of Government 
This set of variables captures migrant’s perceptions of government. The 
grouping includes the following four variables: government is run by a few big 
interests, I have no say in what government does, avoid contact with government, and 
trust government to do right.  The first three questions are coded in the affirmative and 
the latter in the negative to capture skepticism towards government. The first three 
variables are in Likert scale. The last variable includes four responses ranging from 
“never” to “just about always”.  The hypothesized relationship is a positive 
relationship between skepticism and HTA affiliation. 
Dependent Variable 
A Logistic regression model is used to estimate HTA participation.  The 
dependent variable is coded zero for “no” and one for “yes” in response to “Do you 
participate in the activities of a club, association or federation connected to the town or 
province your family came from [Mexico]?” While this variable is not limited 
specifically to participation in HTAs, it operates as a close and meaningful 
approximation of HTA participation. 
Results  
Results of the logistic regression models are found below at the end of this 
section25.  The six columns represent the six models entered additively to illustrate 
25  
a Never joined is reference 
b "No" is reference; c "No" is reference; d "No" is reference; e "No" is reference; I "No" is reference 
f None is reference 
g Never is reference ; m Never is reference ; q Never is reference 
h Less than once a year or never is reference 
j Southeastern is reference 
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 increments in predictive power.  The demographics control group is introduced 
simultaneously with all models to hold individual characteristics constant across 
models.  This allows for greater distinction across models irrespective of individual 
characteristics known to influence HTA participation.   The decreases in log likelihood 
scores immediately at bottom of the regression table indicate that all subsequent 
models add explanatory power.  The various independent variables were significant 
across the models.  Sent money home, household income, government assistance, 
Spanish, age, no documents and the entire Perceptions of Government variables were 
not significant in any of the models.   If we direct our attention to the bottom of the 
table, we note that only some findings for demographic controls are consistent with 
prior findings.  
Model one, represents one of the central themes of this paper, the role of pre- 
migration civic and political participation on HTA participation.  I hypothesized that 
greater civic and political involvement before migration would encourage HTA 
affiliation.  Only civic participation before migration was significant.  This variable is 
significant across all models.  Model two considered post-migration political and civic 
participation.  Similar to model one, amongst the post-migration variables only civic 
participation in the US was significant but voting in Mexico after arrival was not 
significant.  Holding all other variables constant, the odds of HTA membership by 
someone civically active before migration was almost three and a quarter (3.23) times 
k Low Migration and High Marginalization is reference 
l Below $15,000 is reference 
n Strongly agree is reference ; o Strongly agree is reference ; p  Strongly agree is reference 
r Elementary or less is reference 
s With documents is reference 
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 grater than a migrant who never joined.  Post-migration political ties to country of 
origin were important indicators of HTA activity.  Among respondents who answered 
in the affirmative to having donated to parties or candidates and/or paid attention to 
home-country politics after migration, their odds of HTA membership were 3.61 and 
3.40 respectively higher.  Net of all variables, and in comparison to those who never 
donated and/or paid attention to politics in home country.  Descriptive analysis 
demonstrates that pre-migration civic participation does not necessarily translate to 
post-migration participation.  Of all respondents, only sixteen and thirty-four of them 
reported being very active and somewhat active, respectively, before and after 
migration.  Together, these two groups represent about a third of all respondents who 
reported HTA membership.  In fact, only eight respondents were civically active 
before, after, and HTA members.  These numbers demonstrate that pre-migration civic 
participation does not necessarily translate to participation after migration.  
Contrary to my third hypothesis—increase in cross border activities will 
increase HTA affiliation— model three variables contributed very little to explaining 
HTA membership.  Only property ownership in Mexico was significant in this cluster.  
Net of all variables, the odds of HTA membership was 1.95.  
My second hypothesis posited that traditional sending regions and zones with 
high-migration and high-marginalization drive HTA membership numbers up.  Of the 
two variables measuring regional variation, in model four, only the migration and 
marginalization zones proved reliable and significant26.  The results show that HTA 
26I tested for collinearity between the two regional variables.  The Pearson correlation coefficient was 
0.462 demonstrating some collinearity.  Next, I ran model four twice, each time with only one regional 
variable.  By itself, the migration sending regions variable in model four was not significant. However, 
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 members from states in Mexico with low-levels of migration and high-levels of 
marginalization are 2.93 times more likely to be members than respondents from states 
with low-migration and low-marginalization.   
In model five, with regards to resources, I expected a higher level of HTA 
membership due to a larger number of resources. In this cluster, only number who 
contribute to income was significant.  The odds of HTA activity increase by almost 
one and quarter for every additional contributor in the household, net of all variables.  
Because income levels—total household income—are accounted for in the model, 
number who contributes to income indicates that household composition, independent 
of income, plays an important role in HTA participation.   
Model four included four variables assessing perceptions of government.  I 
hypothesized that negative beliefs towards government would increase HTA 
affiliation.  Unexpectedly, the variables in this group did not seem to shed any light on 
HTA participation. 
The control variables, entered in all models, were not significant with the 
exception of being male.  Like Goldring, this finding corroborates prevalence of male 
membership in HTAs (2001).  As predicted, the expected odds of males participating 
in HTAs were 1.64 times greater than the odds of females participating.  Recency of 
migration, measured here as proportion of time in US, was hypothesized and 
confirmed to be negatively related to HTA membership early in the regression model 
but waned off towards the end.  Surprisingly, education was only a slightly important 
indicator of HTA participation notwithstanding a general acceptance that HTA 
the migration and marginalization zones maintained significance at the .05 level but reduced the 
standardized coefficient from 2.93 to 1.96.  
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 participants have higher than average levels of education.  If we look at model one, the 
“some college or more” category is significant and indicates that net of all variables, 
an additional person to contribute to household income increases the odds of HTA 
membership by 1.83 times.  This category looses significance in all models until the 
last model; model 6.  This suggest that education is not an important indicator of HTA 
participation or a sampling artifact reflecting leaders and members of nascent HTAs 
27.   
 
Table 5. Regression of Select Variables on HTA Participation  
27Valenzuela Romo notes that newly formed and emerging HTAs are much more pluralist and inclusive 
with leadership comprised of mostly middle class members (2004).  
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B β B β B β B β B β B β
Pre-migration Particiaption
Civic participation before mig.a
Very active 1.79 5.99 *** 1.25 3.50 *** 1.09 2.97 ** 1.15 3.16 *** 1.11 3.04 ** 1.17 3.23 ***
Somewhat active 1.02 2.77 *** 0.75 2.12 ** 0.63 1.87 * 0.67 1.96 * 0.62 1.86 * 0.67 1.95 *
Member not active 0.65 1.92 0.37 1.45 0.35 1.41 0.44 1.55 0.37 1.45 0.41 1.50
Not active at a l l 0.17 1.18 0.10 1.11 0.07 1.08 0.07 1.08 0.07 1.07 0.11 1.11
Vote in Mexico before mig.b
Yes 0.59 1.81 * 0.41 1.51 0.32 1.37 0.34 1.41 0.38 1.47 0.39 1.47
</=17@ arrive 0.72 2.05 * 0.71 2.03 * 0.77 2.16 ** 0.75 2.13 * 0.72 2.05 * 0.71 2.04 *
Post-migration Participation
Civic participation in USc
Yes 0.72 2.06 *** 0.77 2.16 *** 0.80 2.23 *** 0.85 2.33 *** 0.88 2.42 ***
Voted in Mexico after arriva l d
Yes 0.71 2.03 * 0.55 1.74 0.58 1.78 0.53 1.71 0.60 1.83
Cont. money to party/candidate in MXe
Yes 1.50 4.47 *** 1.44 4.24 *** 1.35 3.85 ** 1.40 4.07 *** 1.28 3.61 **
Attention pa id to pol i tics  in MXf
A lot 1.35 3.85 *** 1.21 3.35 *** 1.19 3.28 *** 1.18 3.26 *** 1.22 3.40 ***
Some 0.66 1.94 * 0.59 1.81 * 0.57 1.77 * 0.59 1.81 * 0.66 1.94 *
Li ttle 0.60 1.83 * 0.55 1.73 * 0.49 1.64 0.49 1.63 0.50 1.65
Cross  Border Activi ty
Times  vis i ted Mexicog
Once a  year or + 0.40 1.50 0.48 1.62 0.48 1.61 0.46 1.58
Once a  year -0.10 0.91 -0.08 0.92 -0.13 0.88 -0.15 0.86
Three years  or + 0.16 1.18 0.12 1.13 0.09 1.10 0.10 1.11
Five years  or + 0.14 1.15 0.14 1.15 0.18 1.20 0.14 1.15
Sent Money Homeh
Once a  year 0.32 1.38 0.29 1.34 0.32 1.37 0.32 1.37
Once few months 0.48 1.61 0.43 1.54 0.43 1.54 0.40 1.50
Once a  month or + 0.53 1.69 0.50 1.64 0.48 1.62 0.42 1.52
Property ownership in Mexicoi
Yes 0.65 1.91 *** 0.65 1.91 *** 0.63 1.88 *** 0.67 1.95 ***
Avg remittance 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.99 -0.01 0.99
Regional  Variation
Migration sending regions j
his torica l 0.70 2.01 0.80 2.23 0.83 2.29
centra l 0.79 2.21 0.87 2.38 0.92 2.51 *
border 0.81 2.24 1.00 2.71 0.95 2.59
Migration and margina l i zation zones k
High Mig / High Marg 0.34 1.41 0.46 1.59 0.41 1.50
High Mig / Low Marg 0.41 1.51 0.54 1.72 0.51 1.67
Low Mig / High Marg 0.99 2.69 * 1.13 3.09 * 1.08 2.93 *
Household Resources
Household incomel
$15,000-24,999 -0.13 0.87 -0.15 0.86
$25,000-34,999 0.06 1.06 0.08 1.08
$35,000-44,999 -0.69 0.50 -0.69 0.50
$45,000-54,999 0.22 1.25 0.27 1.31
$55,000-64,999 -0.05 0.95 -0.04 0.96
ABOVE $65,000 -0.08 0.92 0.01 1.01
Government ass is tancem
Current -0.31 0.73 -0.31 0.73
Past -0.25 0.78 -0.21 0.81
No. support by income -0.06 0.95 -0.06 0.94
No. contribute to income 0.21 1.23 ** 0.21 1.23 **
Perceptions  of Governement
Government i s  run by a  few big interestn
Strongly disagree 0.26 1.29
Somewhat disagree -0.04 0.96
Somewhat agree -0.28 0.75
I have no say in what government does o
Strongly disagree 0.07 1.07
Somewhat disagree -0.03 0.97
Somewhat agree -0.18 0.84
Avoid contact with governmentp
Strongly disagree -0.42 0.66
Somewhat disagree -0.49 0.62
Somewhat agree -0.24 0.79
Trust government to do rightq
Some of the time 0.18 1.19
Most of the time 0.03 1.03
Just about a lways -0.03 0.97
Demographic Controls
Male 0.76 2.13 *** 0.70 2.02 *** 0.58 1.79 ** 0.58 1.79 ** 0.52 1.68 ** 0.49 1.64 *
Highest level  of educationr
Some high school 0.24 1.27 0.15 1.16 0.12 1.13 0.19 1.20 0.21 1.23 0.25 1.29
Some col lege or + 0.61 1.83 * 0.37 1.45 0.35 1.42 0.48 1.61 0.52 1.68 0.62 1.85 *
Spanish -0.41 0.67 -0.21 0.81 -0.33 0.72 -0.39 0.68 -0.39 0.68 -0.30 0.74
Age 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01
No Documents s
Other -0.22 0.81 -0.24 0.78 -0.17 0.84 -0.21 0.81 -0.25 0.78 -0.26 0.77
Miss ing 0.16 1.18 0.10 1.10 0.20 1.22 0.20 1.22 0.18 1.19 0.17 1.18
No Documents -0.47 0.63 -0.46 0.63 -0.45 0.64 -0.43 0.65 -0.38 0.69 -0.37 0.69
Proportion in US -1.17 0.31 * -1.25 0.29 * -1.26 0.28 * -1.26 0.28 * -1.07 0.34 -0.99 0.37
Constant -3.78 0.23 *** -4.54 0.01 *** -6.29 0.00 *** -6.29 0.00 *** -6.68 0.00 *** -6.59 0.00 ***
-2 Log Likelyhood
Note . Source: 2006 Latino National Survey ; B =odds ratio; β= exponential B;  * p< 0.05;  ** p< 0.01;  *** p< 0.001
Model 6
1121.19 1105.47 1088.10 1071.731217.53 1149.66
Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 
Model 5
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 Discussion 
Civic participation is persistently significant before and after migration in 
explaining HTA membership, which conveys some transference of political and civic 
activity from sending to receiving country.  However, if we compare the two forms of 
civic participation, the Wald test statistic and LR confirm that membership in 
organization after arrival is a significantly stronger predictor than pre-migration civic 
participation and it increases the model’s ability to better explain variance in HTA 
membership28.  From these results we can make two important conclusions.   
Foremost, we find that civic society in sending countries matter.  Escobar and 
Portes (2008) find that countries with a limited civil society, like Columbia, tend to 
develop HTAs that primarily focus on philanthropic issues.  Unfortunately, the data 
used by Escobar and Portes does not contain individual level pre-migration variable to 
provide direct evidence.  Thus, their conclusions are made through analytical cross-
country comparisons.  In contrast, our individual level data confirms that migrants, 
who are actively involved in Mexican civic society, are more likely to be involved in 
HTAs.   
Additionally, voting in Mexico before and after migration is not an important 
predictor of HTA membership.  Two points are noteworthy here.  First, voting and 
civic participation are different types of political participation, thus, it is not at all 
surprising that participation in an organization or association in Mexico is a better cue 
for HTA membership in the United States.  However, it is curious that voting in 
28The Wald test statistic for pre-migration civic participation was 10.86, smaller in comparison to post-
migration civic participation (15.27).  The LR statistic was 14.22, larger than the chi-square threshold of 
5.99 with a probability of 0.05 with two degrees of freedom.   
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 Mexico before migration, a more common form of political participation than civic 
participation had no effect HTA membership. Relatedly, a second finding is that 
expatriate voting also does not play an important role in determining whether 
individuals participate in HTAs or not.  This distinction is important because 
transnationalism scholars regularly use both voting from abroad and HTA membership 
as measurements of attachment toward home country.  Pairing of these two social 
phenomena indirectly leads to conflating two processes. 
Two recent works standout as pioneering accounts that shed more light on 
HTA and expatriate voting.  The most recent findings by Leal et al. suggest that the 
prevalence of HTAs, measured as number of Mexican associations per one million 
adults of Mexican descent, is a significant predictor of expatriate voting, measured by 
number of voting ballot solicitations (2012).  In her recent book, Chelius surveyed 
three groups29 1) foot soldiers, 2) CONACYT fellows, and 3) promoters of expatriate 
voting involved in the 2006 voting from abroad campaigns (2010).  Chelius recounts 
that the Mexican Institute of Federal Elections (IFE) reached out to HTAs late in the 
game but still mobilized expatriate voting.  The authors, along with findings from my 
model six, indicate that the relationship between HTAs and voting abroad is 
unidirectional.  In other words, in 2006 the presence of HTAs helped expatriate 
voting, but the same relationship cannot be said of expatriate voting on HTA 
membership; voting from abroad does not translate to HTA participation.   
29 Foot soldiers consisted of a sample of labor migrants in, CONACYT fellows was comprised of grad 
students abroad on Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT) fellowships, and promoters 
of expatriate voting were individuals who helped to mobilize expatriate voting.  See (Chelius 2010) 
page 20 to 23 and appendix for sampling selection and methodology.  
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 Two overlapping explanations are in order.  The first is the most obvious.  The 
ability for Mexicans to vote from abroad is a misnomer; it is rather an inability to vote 
from abroad.  As numerous scholars have elaborated, the procedures to vote from 
abroad are insurmountable.  Secondly, as a consequence, voting from abroad is a 
highly selective endeavor.  For example, Chelius reports that 65 percent of CONACYT 
fellows30 voted from abroad, versus 16 percent of foot soldiers.  When asked “do you 
plan to vote in future elections” 92 percent of CONACYT fellows and 68 percent of 
foot soldiers responded in the affirmative31.  In summation, HTA membership and 
expatriate voting are generally circumscribed to different forms of cross-border 
participation and should be treated as such.  
Yet, HTA membership is also highly selective.  Unlike Aparicio (2011), our 
migration intensity and marginalization index in sending states can be generalized to a 
larger group of HTAs beyond those that participate in the 3x1 program.  Our findings 
suggest that HTA members are more likely to come from regions in Mexico with low 
migration intensity and high marginalization.  As we hypothesized, regions with 
higher levels of marginalization are in effect in greater need of group remittances and 
philanthropy.  But why might HTAs cluster in areas with low migration?  Two 
possible explanations are that 1) HTA activity is influenced more by marginalization 
intensity than migration intensity and 2) the migration index could be capturing areas 
with a nascent history of migration and exhibiting low levels of migration.  The first 
30 See table X. for distribution of expatriate voters in Mexico City.  A large percentage came from the 
Álvaro Obregón borough.  Because this borough is comprised of both wealthy and poor communities it 
is difficult to ascertain income composition.  
31 Suro (2006) also found that 87% of Mexicans surveyed responded yes to “If you could vote in the 
next Mexican elections from the U.S. would you?” 
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 explanation was  noted by Aparicio and Meseguer in their findings, but the jury is still 
out on the relationship between migration and poverty (2012).  A future model should 
rigorously evaluate migration intensity and poverty as separate categories with raw 
data rather than the simplified typology used here.  
Turning our attention to cross border activity my findings reflect those of other 
scholars like Waldinger (2011:24) who find that connections to home country are 
inconsistent predictors of political participation.  For example, as noted by Waldinger 
certain types of connections are devoid of any sort of political participation, such as 
remittances that have increasingly become more and more effortless.  The effects of 
cross border activity point to the direction that materially based connections hold 
more weight with respect to engagement in HTAs than other cross border activities.  
Of all related variables, only property ownership in Mexico was significant.  This 
indicates that as a consequence of having a tangible stake in the home country, 
migrant’s invested interest in land and property increases their likelihood to participate 
in HTAs.  Data from the 3x1 program (2002-2007)32 affirms HTA’s convergence on 
land improvements.  Consider the top three types of funded development projects: 
pavement and hydraulic cement (30 Percent), and lighting and sidewalks (21.4 
percent), and electrification (12.7 percent) (Gonzalez Rodriguez 2011).  A future 
model should include a greater number of connectivity variables based on material 
interest33 to strengthen this finding. 
32 The 3x1 data is derived from a sample of 150 projects for each of three states in Mexico: Jalisco, 
Oaxaca, and Zacatecas.  Because these three states encompass three of the four sending regions the 
sample is a good enough approximation of most HTA projects in Mexico.  
33 A variable measuring whether respondents had children in Mexico was dropped for conceptual 
reasons and was not significant.  
40 
 
                                                 
 Similarly, the household resource group only contained one statistically 
significant variable.  The importance of this variable posits the importance that larger 
number of people who contribute to household plays in collective action.  The HTA 
literature suggests that at the organizational level HTAs, at least initially, are resource 
deprived and individually members have higher than average levels of education and 
income.  One plausible explanation is the detection and prevalence of multi-generation 
dwelling, or multi-dweller families and living structures.  For example, Portes et al. 
report that married men have a greater likelihood of participation34(2009).  
Alternatively, these households could be relatively new migrant households that are 
initially comprised of various related adults.  These types of living arrangement are 
consistent with the literature concerning smaller HTA organizational structures that 
initiate at the household level later to include extended family members and fellow 
paisanos35.  In summary these results indicate that in addition to thick migrant 
networks, dense family arrangements are important for HTA membership.  
Lastly, the remaining set of variables—perceptions of government—found not 
to be significant36, emphasize the diminished role that political beliefs and perceptions 
have towards HTA membership in contrast to more concrete forms of politics, such as 
pre-migration voting.   
 
34 Future research should incorporate marriage into model. 
35 In a survey of one hundred HTAs in Los Angeles and Chicago, Orozco (2003) finds that most 
organizations are aggregates of families that join together to engage in community projects in towns 
of origin.  
36 I post-tested the perception of government variable cluster by running a logistic model with only 
these variables as independent variables and HTA membership as the outcome variable.  The results 
indicated similar results to the full model with no significance and no explanatory power.  
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 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I posited the importance of HTA participation as a form of civic 
activity with important antecedents in Mexico and important implications in the 
United States.  As such, my findings were both expected and surprising and illuminate 
important factors that influence HTA membership. Briefly returning to Putnam, this 
thesis demonstrates that civic participation must be understood as a transformative 
process based on sending and receiving communities, not strictly limited to place 
based social capital in receiving countries, but across the migration process.  Future 
research should address the longevity of civic participation amongst migrants active 
before and after migration.  
With regards to the general transnationalism literature, my results clarify some 
of the reasons individuals participate in HTAs.  Firstly, materially driven actions 
increase the likelihood of HTA membership, such as property ownership in Mexico.  
Secondly, future quantitative analysis should use greater caution when pairing HTA 
participation and expatriate voting as similar representations of transnationalism.  
Thirdly, as reported elsewhere, civic and political participation in the sending and host 
country is not a zero sum relationship.  Rather participation in either is complimentary 
to the other.  
Additionally, some regional variation in HTA membership was expected.  
However, the low-migration and high-marginalization category was not anticipated to 
show significance.  Criticisms aside, for using fixed categories rather than raw data, 
my findings reflect changing migration patterns from Mexico and note the prevalence 
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 of participation of newer sending regions with low-migration and high-
marginalization.   
Unfortunately, HLM revealed that state level variation was not a significant 
factor in explaining HTA participation.  Pre-migration political and civic participation 
are products of civic culture in Mexico, along with regional consideration, these topics 
should inform future work to more rigorously consider sending country ecological 
factors.  Similarly, decentralization and democratization in Mexico has lead to various 
representations of state engagement that require additional data collection to 
approximate findings in previous case studies.  Furthermore, as proposed by Anaya a 
comprehensive evaluation of HTAs requires a temporal dimension.  
Low within-state variation was expected given the small number of cases 
within states.  However, the low between-state variation was not anticipated given the 
literature on HTAs and ecological state variables demonstrated potential variation.  
One possible explanation for low between-state variation is that variation is clustered 
by sending regions37 or some other entity not captured by states as units of analysis.   
Future research should explore the spatial nature of the data, transitional 
probabilities, as well as variable interactions.   Spatial analysis should include 
dissection to test for clustering suggested by the data itself or other analytically 
factors.  Additionally, analysis such as spatial interpolation can be conducted to gain 
greater information concerning spatial relationships and spatial autocorrelation.  
Another prospect is the inclusion of progression ratios in the model to account 
for transition possibilities (Treiman 2009).  By including progression ratios the model 
37 To test for clustering by migration sending regions I tested for between region variations without 
significant results. 
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 can potentially measure the odds of HTA participation across the migration process.  
For example, if we can calculate the odds of respondents who were civically active 
before and after migration, then we may determine the odds of HTA participation and 
interactions. 
Lastly, a more robust model should account for interactions among the 
independent variables.   The following two thematic examples illustrate how 
interactions can benefit the model:  institutionalism and return migration.  As Kam and 
Franzese remind us institutions contain and shape politics but are never a sole 
determinant of outcomes (2007).  For the model at hand, state institutions in Mexico 
mitigate or shape relationships between migration flows and HTA membership.  One 
possible way to capture this is through an interaction using a dummy variable for 
Mexican state offices of emigrant affairs and the migration intensity index.  A second 
example is an interaction between member of org. before migration and visits to test if 
return visits to Mexico mitigate the effects of pre-migration civic participation on 
HTA activity.  
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 APPENDIX 
1. List of Independent Variables: Names and Description   
Variables Description 
Pre-migration Participation   
Civic participation before migration Participate in various types of civic 
participation 
Vote in Mexico before migration Voted before first migration to US 
Post-migration Participation   
Civic participation in US Participates in civic/community organizations 
in US 
Voted in Mexico after arrival Voted in Mexico after Migrating to US 
Contributed money to party/candidate 
in MX 
Contributed money to party or candidate in 
Mexico 
Attention paid to politics in MX Pays attention to politics in Mexico 
Cross Border Activity   
Times visited Mexico Times visited Mexico 
Sent Money Home Times sent  money to Mexico 
Property ownership in Mexico Owns property in Mexico 
Avg remittance Average amount of remittance sent 
Regional Variation   
Migration sending regions Sending regions according to Massey and 
Durand (2003) 
Migration and marginalization zones Typology of states with varying degrees of 
migration and marginalization intensity  
Socio-Economic Household Resources   
Household income Total earned household income in seven 
brackets 
Government assistance Prior, current, or never received government 
assistance 
Number supported by income Number of people who are supported by 
household income 
Number contribute to income Number of people who work to contribute to 
household income 
Perceptions of Government   
Government is run by a few big interest Government is run by a few big interest and 
not for public benefit 
I have no say in what government does People have no voice in government affairs 
Avoid contact with government Avoid contact with government 
Trust government to do right How often trust government 
Demographic Controls   
Male Gender of respondent 
Highest level of education Highest level of education achieved 
Spanish Language preferred during interview 
Age Age of respondent 
No Documents Immigration status of respondent 
Proportion in US number of years in US in relation to age 
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey ; 2005 and 2010 Mexican census data is used for 
regional variables made available by the National Population Council (Consejo Nacional 
de Poblacion-CONAPO) 
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 2. Cross Tabulations of LNS Variables  
 HTA Membership 
  Yes No Total 
 Demographic Characteristics    
 1. Male (%) 66.4 45.4 46.3 
 2. Education (%)    
 Elementary or < 23.7 34.1 33.7 
 Some H.S. 46.1 47.8 47.7 
 Some College 30.3 18.1 18.6 
 3. Spanish Pref. (%) 77.0 84.6 84.2 
 4. Reg. of Origin (%)    
 Historic 43.4 45.5 45.4 
 Central 32.9 27.5 27.7 
 Southeast 5.9 4.8 4.9 
 Border 17.8 22.2 22.0 
 5. Migration and Marginalization (%)    
 High Migration/High Marginalization 35.8 38.0 37.9 
 High Migration/Low Marginalization 20.9 20.8 20.8 
 Low Migration/High Marginalization 25.0 29.3 29.2 
 Low Migration/Low Marginalization 18.2 11.9 12.1 
 6. Rec. Gov. Asst. (%)    
 Current 8.2 14.1 13.9 
 Past 12.2 15.8 15.6 
 Never 79.6 70.1 70.5 
 7. Year Arrived U.S. (?̅?) 1990 1989 1989 
 8. Age (?̅?) 37.5 38.0 38.0 
 9. Proportion lived in U.S. (?̅?) 0.41 0.43 0.43 
 10. No Documents (%) 17.2 22.5 22.3 
 11. Union Participation (%) 9.4 6.7 6.8 
 12. Household Income (%)    
 < 15,000 22.2 24.2 24.1 
 15,000 – 24,999 23.8 28.9 28.6 
 25,000 – 34,999 22.2 20.7 20.7 
 35,000 – 44,999 7.1 11.5 11.3 
 45,000 – 54,999 9.5 5.5 5.7 
 55,000 – 64,999 5.6 4.0 4.1 
 > 65,000 9.5 5.2 5.4 
 13. Number of Workers in household (?̅?) 2.3 1.9 1.9 
 14. Number Supported by Income (?̅?) 3.6 3.7 3.7 
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 HTA Membership 
  Yes No Total 
 Political Participation    
 15. Vote in Mexico Before Migration (%) 53.4 39.6 40.2 
 16. Attention to Politics in Mexico (%)    
 A lot 32.9 11.4 12.3 
 Some 28.8 25.5 25.6 
 Little 21.9 25.3 25.5 
 None 16.4 37.7 36.9 
 17. Active in Organization before Migration (%)    
 Very Active 10.1 1.9 2.3 
 Somewhat active 16.9 6.9 7.3 
 Member not active 3.4 1.9 2.0 
 Not active at all 24.3 28.5 28.3 
 Never joined 45.3 60.8 60.1 
 18. Donated to Party/Candidate after Migration (%) 6.9 0.9 1.1 
 19. Vote in Mexico after Migration (%) 11.6 2.9 3.3 
     
 Transnational Ties    
 20. Property Ownership in Mexico (%) 57.2 32.2 33.0 
 21. Average Amount Remitted (?̅?)  504.4 400.6 412.3 
 22. Number of Times Visit Mexico (%)     
 > Once a year 19.7 12.7 13.0 
 Once a year 21.1 21.7 21.7 
 < Once in 5 years 22.4 20.5 20.6 
 > 5 years ago 10.9 12.9 12.9 
 Never 25.9 32.1 31.9 
 23. Sent Money Home (%)    
 Once month or more 53.1 37.2 37.8 
 Once few months  17.0 15.4 15.5 
 Once a year 6.1 7.9 7.8 
 < Once year or never 23.8 39.5 38.9 
 24. Citizen of U.S. (%) 33.6 26.1 26.4 
     
 Skepticism in Government    
 25. Government is Run by Big Business (%)    
 Strongly Disagree 23.0 16.1 16.4 
 Somewhat Disagree 16.5 17.9 17.8 
 Somewhat Agree 22.3 28.9 28.6 
 Strongly Agree 38.1 37.1 37.1 
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 HTA Membership 
  Yes No Total 
 26. No Say in Government Actions (%)    
 Strongly Disagree 24.3 20.7 20.9 
 Somewhat Disagree 20.0 20.7 20.7 
 Somewhat Agree 21.4 25.2 25.0 
 Strongly Agree 34.3 33.4 33.4 
     
 27. Better off Avoiding Government (%)    
 Strongly Disagree 38.8 34.5 34.7 
 Somewhat Disagree 19.4 25.8 25.5 
 Somewhat Agree 17.9 20.8 20.7 
 Strongly Agree 23.9 18.9 19.1 
     
 28. Trust in Government to do Right (%)    
 Never 18.4 20.1 20.1 
 Some of the Time 50.7 49.1 49.2 
 Most of the Time 17.1 16.0 16.0 
 Just about Always 13.8 14.8 14.7 
 
3. Various State-level Variables Regressed on Civic Engagement (ENCUP) 
 
Variables Std. Error Std. Beta t Sig.   R-sq 
Marginalization index 0.000 0.194 1.083 0.288   0.038 
Migration index 0.000 -0.006 -0.035 0.972   0.000 
PAN state party 0.001 0.019 0.103 0.919   0.000 
Corruption index 0.000 0.142 0.784 0.439   0.020 
Transparency in government 0.001 -0.266 -1.512 0.141   0.071 
Efficency public expenditure 0.000 0.076 0.420 0.678   0.006 
Internet usage 0.000 -0.331 -1.924 0.064   0.110 
NGO density per thousand 0.005 -0.359 -2.105 0.044 * 0.129 
State office of emigrant affairs 0.001 -0.016 -0.086 0.932   0.000 
State GDP 0.002 -0.289 -1.652 0.109   0.083 
3x1 investment  0.000 0.180 0.916 0.368   0.032 
3x1 average prjct amount 0.000 -0.283 -1.474 0.153   0.080 
Source: 2008 Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Politica y Practicas Ciudadanas.  Collected and 
made available by INEGI 
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 4. Various State-level Variables Regressed on Civic Engagement (LNS) 
Variable Std. Error Std. Beta t Sig.   R Sq 
Migration index 0.004 0.489 3.072 0.004 ** 0.239 
Efficiency public expenditure 0.000 0.431 2.615 0.014 * 0.186 
Internet usage 0.000 -0.266 -1.510 0.141   0.071 
NGO density per thousands 0.068 -0.228 -1.283 0.209   0.052 
State office of emigrant affairs 0.010 0.423 2.557 0.016 * 0.179 
State GDP 0.019 -0.309 -1.778 0.086   0.095 
3x1average prjct amount 0.005 -0.479 -2.729 0.011 * 0.229 
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey 
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